National Document for the Second Congress of the PST
A new situation characterized by the crisis of the Milei government
The crisis of Milei's capitalist government opens a new juncture in the country's political situation, characterized by the enormous effort of the entire political superstructure to try to avoid a revolutionary crisis by diverting the political situation toward elections. The crisis of Milei's government confirms the characterizations we presented in the document "The New PST Facing the Milei Government," where we explained that Milei's government was a weak capitalist government, contrary to the absurd claims made by reformist left-wing groups that Milei was a "strong" and "fascist" government . Within this context, a fundamental political process, the crisis and collapse of Peronism, is exacerbated. We detailed this in the document "The Political Revolution and the End of Peronism," which we approved at our First Congress. That document armed us politically because we anticipated the collapse of the main counter-revolutionary apparatus, which has been the leadership of the workers' movement and the people for the last 80 years.
In this document, we will detail the characteristics of the new changes occurring within the crisis of Peronism in order to address these new developments. As part of this crisis, the crisis of the reformist left, unified around the "Myriam 2027" policy, is developing with considerable force. This crisis reveals its adaptation to the regime, its increasingly overtly social-democratic character, and the failure of its reformist project. These events reignite the debate on "Reform or Revolution," which we propose to bring to the forefront of activism. This allows us to undertake the tasks of struggle through activism and opens up excellent opportunities for building a movement, because we know that many will opt for a revolutionary project.
The crisis of Milei's government in the global crisis of capitalism
Global capitalism is emerging from one collapse and heading toward another, navigating several simultaneous crises such as those affecting global corporations, China, Japan, Europe, and so on. Within this context, Milei seeks to establish a new accumulation regime for the Argentine capitalist economy. Given that an accumulation regime is a mode of operation for capitalism in a given period, in this case, the "Milei model" aims to overcome the crisis of the previous accumulation regime established by the Kirchnerist governments, which erupted at the end of the Alberto-Cristina-Massa administration. This collapse manifested as semi-hyperinflation, which dealt a brutal blow to the living conditions of millions and accelerated the people's break with the Peronist government and Peronism. The " Milei model " is a new accumulation regime based on 3 branches of production: 1) Energy with gas and oil centered on Vaca Muerta, Neuquén and Río Negro 2) Mining centered on gold, lithium and silver based on San Juan, Catamarca, Jujuy, Salta and Mendoza 3) The food industry and the agro-industrial complex, based on Santa Fe and La Pampa.
The new Milei "model" seeks to guarantee profits for imperialist investment capital and the massive influx of imperialist capital to finance the "model . " Thus, the government's primary concern is maintaining what bourgeois economists call "macroeconomics" —that is, the economic variables that interest the ruling classes and imperialist corporations for investment, such as the inflation rate, the dollar exchange rate, country risk, interest rates, and so on. What these bourgeois and imperialist sectors need is the absence of "risk" —that is, guaranteed conditions for capital investment without expropriation or nationalization of any kind. The entire objective of all Milei's legislation, from the first Emergency Decree to the "RIGI" or "Super RIGI" (Incentive Regime for Large Investments), and the law that explicitly protects "private property," is to reassure imperialist investors.
The new Milei model shares some elements with the "K model," such as the agro-industrial complex and mining, which are enormous sources of dollars and profits for agricultural pools, multinationals, and the Argentine agro-exporting bourgeoisie. However, the "Milei model" is entirely novel in that it transforms Argentina's capitalist economy into an exclusively export-oriented one, receiving millions of dollars in investments and payments for goods sold abroad. It also places Argentina's semi-colonial structure within the framework of imperialism's international division of labor, which demands raw materials: oil, gas, lithium, gold, silver, soybeans, meat, and wheat.
The Achilles' heel, the weakness of the "Milei model," is that it is deeply recessionary. It doesn't generate a large number of jobs, nor does it promote sectors of production that develop a domestic market. This implies a scenario of factory closures, from the largest to the smallest SMEs, which are entering a crisis due to the collapse in mass consumption, leaving a trail of enormous unemployment. Industrial production is collapsing, with peak declines such as 11.4% in April 2026, and nine sectors of production showing drops exceeding 20%, while two sectors—machinery and equipment and textiles—are declining by more than 30%. Sectors such as textiles, automotive, rubber, plastics, and metalworking are operating at barely 40% of their installed capacity. Meanwhile, commerce and construction are collapsing because there is no development of construction outside of luxury projects in gated communities or wealthy neighborhoods; a complete industrial collapse that explains why the closure of FATE hit the collective unconscious
In other words, the "Milei model" is an export-oriented model designed for a small country that creates an extremely wealthy bourgeoisie closely allied with imperialist capital, but excludes the vast majority of the population and exacerbates social inequalities. Furthermore, it is a capitalist accumulation regime that leaves millions sinking into unemployment and poverty because it is profoundly recessionary and fails to develop sectors of production for the domestic market. Consequently, areas with the highest concentration of workers, such as Greater Buenos Aires, Greater Rosario, Greater La Plata, and Córdoba, are left out of the "model ," with millions suffering severe hardship. Moreover, while the "Milei model" curbed hyperinflation, it did not stop inflation, which remains high at between 2% and 3% per month.
This inflation rate implies a permanent rise in the cost of living, resulting in a process of "stagflation" (recession + inflation), a characteristic element of the global capitalist crisis. This is the weak point of the "Milei model," which sets the stage for a massive explosion of discontent among the millions excluded from it . This means that what the bourgeoisie calls "microeconomics" —that is, the variables that matter to the people, such as the price of bread, meat, rent, and bus fares—increase in price every day. While this model is being implemented by a government that constantly promotes the virtues of capitalism, it is perfectly aware of the global crisis and aligns itself with the broader trends of this global capitalist crisis.
The "Milei model," when it managed to curb inflation, raised certain expectations among some sectors of the population, especially the middle class. However, we are now at a different juncture, where the mass movement is beginning to understand where the "model" is leading and the appalling consequences it is causing. This is where the fragility of the "Milei model" lies : it is not based on benefits for the masses, even partial ones, as the "K model" was, but rather on a very small segment of the population, a highly concentrated sector of capitalists. This material element is at the root of the hatred felt by millions toward the government, the radicalization of mass sectors, and a sector of activism that we will analyze later.
For this problem, the bourgeoisie has only one response: to maintain a massive amount of poverty subsidies, a feature that continues from the "K model," with the only difference being that previously these subsidies were managed by social movements, and now they are managed primarily by the Ministry of Human Capital—that is, by the government itself. But the key to the success of this entire model is that Milei can implement it smoothly, without a major strike or mobilization derailing the government's plans , triggering a dollar run, or causing capital flight that would bring down the government and its agenda. For this to work, the Milei model requires a bourgeois "non-violent" agreement , because imperialist capital needs relative "social peace" to invest. That is why the union bureaucracy and the entire superstructure will categorically refuse to promote any plan of action or mobilization that could overthrow the government, and their policy is to channel all the discontent generated by the "model" into the 2027 elections.
The crux of the matter is that the crisis of global capitalism, and the crisis of capitalist Argentina, leaves no room for an alternative "model" to Milei's. Even Cristina Fernández de Kirchner began to defend "fiscal stability," meaning that there is no anti-imperialist bourgeois sector in Argentina that offers a capitalist model qualitatively different from Milei's and that opposes the plans of imperialism. That is why the claims of Peronism and the FITU (Workers' Left Front) are false; they only talk about "renegotiating the external debt" and promise a humane capitalism that can provide better wages, education, and healthcare by renegotiating with the IMF. The reality for the people is the growing deterioration of their living conditions and the increasing popular awareness of where the "Milei model" is leading within the context of the global capitalist crisis.
The crisis of Milei's government and the rise of the masses
The Milei government's advance toward a new accumulation regime is causing increased hunger and poverty, and a serious deterioration in the living conditions of large segments of the population. This is triggering a rise in the mass movement, a process of political radicalization, and a leftward shift among these masses as they search for leadership. This leftward shift cannot find political expression because all the established political leadership and the entire political superstructure of the country have violently shifted to the right in defense of capitalist Argentina.
Several questions must be answered to understand the reality of the class struggle in the current situation. What constitutes the rise of the mass movement? Why did it take so long to begin? Why hasn't there been an uprising against the government yet? We will answer these questions to arm ourselves politically, starting from the fact that the characterization of the Milei government as weak has been perfectly demonstrated in reality: It is a government lurching from crisis to crisis, whose chief of staff, Adorni, has fallen due to corruption allegations, which is plagued by serious internal conflicts, and cornered by the corruption cases it has accumulated, such as the Libra case, or the allegations of corruption related to disability services.
It is a government that only has the support of 20% or 30% of the population: sectors of the bourgeoisie, the upper middle class, civil servants, and the union bureaucracy who benefit from the "Milei model" because they live luxuriously. The rise of the mass movement is expressed in the population's hatred of the government, which ranges between 70% and 80% of the mass movement, rejecting it and making it one of the most hated governments in history, with levels of hatred comparable to those of governments like Menem's or the military regimes. All sectors of the mass movement have had to dramatically adjust their living conditions. Meat consumption has collapsed and has been surpassed by chicken and pork; millions continue to rely on soup kitchens and receive subsidies and food baskets, while the indebtedness of the working class grows with credit cards and loans to buy food.
The rise of anti-government sentiment and hatred was slow to erupt, primarily due to the lower inflation rate, which fueled expectations among segments of the population. The final year of the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner-Alberto Fernández-Massa administration saw inflation four times higher than the current rate, reaching peaks of 25% per month. The relief that the lower inflation rate brought to millions generated these expectations. Furthermore, the widespread praise for austerity measures, coupled with cuts to subsidies and ministries that were clearly Kirchnerist strongholds, led many to believe the government's austerity plan was justified. However, as the consequences of the Milei model began to devastate businesses, jobs, and wages, public perception shifted. It was the leadership's betrayal that delayed the mass movement's understanding of where the "model" was leading, but ultimately, as a result of the bitter and painful experience endured by the people, the government now faces massive public rejection.
A government controlled by large global imperialist corporations and Wall Street, with officials who are direct representatives of Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan Chase—which had to be bailed out by the Trump administration in 2024 to win the election—why does it continue to govern despite being so weak? Why doesn't it collapse? The fundamental reason is that all the bourgeois, reformist, and bureaucratic leaderships are propping up the government by refusing to promote even the slightest movement that might hinder the implementation of its plan. This is precisely because all these leaderships are aware of the government's weakness and know that any movement, however small—a parliamentary rejection, a strike, a legal maneuver—could derail the government's plan and bring down the government itself. Even sectors within the government and the bourgeoisie see the elimination of the primary elections (PASO) as necessary to prevent a bank run in the event of a government defeat.
This explains why such a weak, internally divided, and widely hated government, with such limited popular support, continues to govern. The balance of power between the classes is unfavorable to the government, leaving it in a weakened state, while Peronism no longer possesses the capacity for containment it once had. What keeps the government alive, more than its "strength," is the terror of the entire bourgeoisie and its institutions of a new insurrection, which, unlike the Argentinazo of 2001, no longer has a Peronist Party or Duhalde to save it. In the event of a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie is aware that the regime is in a serious crisis, unable to contain it because the bourgeois parties—Peronism, the PRO, the Civic Coalition, the union bureaucracy, social movements, etc.—all suffer from widespread disrepute. Ironically, the lack of a bourgeois or reformist opposition with authority or prestige gives the government a relative respite.
This explains why an explosion that would put the government in a difficult position has not yet occurred. However, insofar as the "Milei model" cannot solve the problem of hunger, which is central to capitalist Argentina, the government's situation remains fragile and hanging by a thread. On the other hand, the increase in social inequality is what fuels political radicalization, as we expressed in the national document: "...While half the population sinks into poverty and misery, a 1% oligarchy grows ever richer. Economic groups like Pan American Energy, Mercado Libre, Techint, Pérez Companc, Roemmers, Insud, Werthein, Indalo, Arcor, or De Narváez, linked to imperialism, bankers, and global corporations, are the owners of Argentina" (The Political Revolution and the End of Peronism, 1st Congress of the New PST).
However, the most likely scenario is that the crisis of the Milei government will deepen, a product of popular discontent. All capitalist governments worldwide are experiencing severe crises and facing challenges because capitalism only offers hunger and poverty across the five continents. Milei's government will be no exception, and despite this "joint" effort to try to steer the entire political situation toward the elections, it is highly probable that the government will reach the 2027 elections in the midst of a crisis. We cannot rule out the possibility that a stock market crash, a dollar crisis, or a major conflict could trigger a political crisis before or during the 2027 elections.
The political revolution deepens, as does the crisis of the bourgeois democratic regime and of Peronism.
A political revolution is unfolding around the world and in Argentina, where the masses are beginning to break with their traditional leadership, which is impacting bourgeois democracy and its institutions. In turn, the rise of opposition to the government and the deepening crisis of Peronism are triggering a process of radicalization of activism and a leftward shift among the masses. What do we mean when we speak of radicalization and a leftward shift? When sectors of the masses reject all capitalist political parties, reject bourgeois democracy, its methods and institutions, and do not call for the intervention of the military or the armed forces—that is, they do not seek a solution through counter-revolutionary means, but rather a solution outside the regime—but this is the limit to the evolution of mass consciousness.
The leftward shift of the masses, the tendencies to reject the old leadership and the regime, are unconscious movements, a reflection of class consciousness in sectors of the mass movement that do not automatically imply a revolutionary socialist consciousness. Mass sectors can only reach a revolutionary consciousness if they have a revolutionary, Marxist leadership capable of guiding them. In Argentina, this phenomenon of rupture and unconscious tendencies against the leadership and the regime has been growing significantly since 2021, as has abstention, blank votes, and null votes, which were the leading force in the last legislative elections of 2024. This movement is part of the "abstentionist wave" sweeping the world and has been developing, along with the crisis of the counter-revolutionary leadership.
The battle to impose our revolutionary socialist program is a battle against the counter-revolutionary political leaderships that intervene: reformism, Peronism, the trade union bureaucracy, and the various forms of class collaboration, all of which seek to contain radicalization and keep it within the limits of the bourgeois regime. Therefore, for revolutionary Marxism, the decisive question is not merely recognizing the existence of a leftward shift, but contesting its political leadership. In What Is to Be Done?, Lenin argues that the consciousness of the workers develops in struggle and that the task of the revolutionary party is to elevate that experience to a revolutionary political consciousness, because the spontaneous radicalization of the masses alone is not enough to seize power.
Within the framework of these general trends in the political revolution, we must pinpoint the core of the process, which is the crisis of Peronism. The revolutionary upsurge, combined with the political revolution, is destroying Peronism, whose crisis is deepening, and we must precisely define where it stands. At the last PST Congress, we stated that Peronism was beginning to implode due to the rupture between its base and its leadership, reflected in the loss of almost 5 million votes that enabled Milei's victory. However, we must clarify that the crisis of Peronism has worsened considerably since our last Congress.
Today, Peronism is publicly divided into two factions: Kirchnerism on one side, and Kicillof's PJ on the other. There is also a third Peronism more closely linked to governors and mayors in need of funds. This situation within the PJ is a new phenomenon, one that did not exist at the previous Congress of the New PST. The possibility of a fracture and breakup of the old bourgeois party is no longer occurring from the bottom up, but rather at the level of its leadership, cadres, and mid-level officials. This new scenario could lead Peronism to split into two or three parts if the dispute between Cristina and Kicillof worsens and they fail to reach an agreement. It is even possible that they will reach an agreement and run together in the elections, but as two separate organizations, even with a common electoral slogan.
This division within Peronism signifies the deepening of the political revolution that threatens to bring Peronism to its breaking point. It is a very significant process that impacts the entire bourgeois state and mass organizations, because Peronism has historically controlled the Armed Forces, the security services, the union bureaucracy, the police, the Church, the judiciary, the unions, social organizations, human rights groups, feminist organizations, youth groups, intellectual organizations, and so on. As the division and fragmentation of this apparatus worsens, cracks begin to appear in all areas of the state and the regime, and confrontations between all these sectors and leaderships intensify. We are talking about the disintegration of the party that led the Argentine working class for over 80 years. Without this process advancing, it becomes impossible for us to influence sectors of activism. This crisis and division within Peronism also encompasses corruption allegations involving all political sectors, including the government, but its epicenter is within Peronism itself, whose leaders and political operatives, along with the security forces, also control the human trafficking and drug trade.
Therefore, as this process unfolds, the crisis of Peronism unleashes new tendencies and allows us to establish a dialogue with workers' and popular activism under different conditions, although this process is still developing unevenly and in a mixed fashion—more advanced in some places, lagging behind in others. But overall, it expresses a profound shift in the consciousness of significant sectors of the masses, and while winning over mass sectors is not our goal, it is important because it opens up significant opportunities to gain valuable cadres, which will strengthen our project of building a vanguard party. The rise of Myriam Bregman also reflects the leftward shift, beyond the PTS and FITU's policy of taking this process to the electoral arena, towards a reformist path.
As part of the radicalization process and shift to the left, a global trend toward self-organization, Sovietization, and self-determination began to emerge. These growing tendencies to seek answers outside the traditional mechanisms of bourgeois democracy, incorporating elements of self-organization, also began to manifest themselves in our country through some of the most significant struggles of the period, such as those waged by state employees in Misiones alongside the police, the struggles at the Garrahan Hospital, the university protests, the mobilizations in Patagonia, the protests against mega-mining companies in San Juan and Mendoza, and the teachers' struggles in Jujuy and Catamarca, among others. A key characteristic of all these processes was the absence of the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) or the CTAs (Argentine Workers' Central Unions), which appeared with a largely symbolic role. This allowed for the development of self-organizing tendencies led by independent activists—a process that has become a permanent feature of the struggles of this period, as part of the broader process of political revolution.
Crisis of the union bureaucracy: Another pillar of the regime is crumbling
The most likely scenario is that the crisis of the regime and the process of political revolution will deepen; one need only look at what is happening in the rest of the world. And this is because the crisis of Peronism is not merely electoral: it expresses the historical exhaustion of a movement that for decades acted as the main mechanism for containing capitalism and that today has lost that capacity. A concrete example is the end of impunity, with Cristina Kirchner imprisoned for corruption, but the break of growing sectors of the masses with traditional parties finds its counterpart in the increasingly profound questioning of the leadership of the union bureaucracy.
The union bureaucracy has ceased to represent the historical interests of the working class, transforming into a privileged stratum integrated into the state itself and linked to the interests of employers. Its function is no longer to organize the struggle for workers' demands, but rather to contain mobilization, defuse conflicts, and guarantee the social peace necessary to preserve capital's profits. In recent years, this role has become even more evident. Faced with the constant loss of purchasing power, layoffs, disguised labor reforms, and the rise of precarious employment, union leadership has responded by signing wage agreements below the rate of inflation, accepting labor flexibilization, isolating the most important struggles, and avoiding the development of a genuine national plan of action capable of confronting austerity measures.
This policy of constant conciliation with employers and various governments deepens the disrepute of the union bureaucracy among broad sectors of the working class. Every major conflict highlights the contradiction between the needs of the rank and file and the decisions of the union leadership. Therefore, the challenge to the bureaucracy is no longer limited to demands for better leadership, but is beginning to express a deeper crisis of legitimacy for those who have historically acted as mediators between capital and labor.
The political crisis of Milei's government, the exhaustion of Peronism, and the growing discrediting of Parliament are thus combined with the erosion of traditional union leadership. The main mechanisms by which the bourgeoisie managed for decades to contain and divert the class struggle are simultaneously weakening. But the division within Peronism is beginning to show cracks and splits within the bureaucratic wings of the various unions. For example, the growing divisions made it possible for the teachers' union bureaucracy in the province of Buenos Aires to lose the Matanza branch, because a sector of the bureaucracy, the PCR linked to Kirchnerism, broke with Baradel's Celeste list and made an agreement with the Multicolor list, which allowed the Multicolor list to win the union. This is a clear indication of the crisis facing the union bureaucracy.
What happened in SUTEBA Matanza also shows that while the union bureaucracy continues to use the union apparatus to preserve its privileges and negotiate with employers, much of the reformist left limits its intervention to vying for positions by making deals with employer sectors within those same structures, without promoting a strategy of class independence or a consequent struggle for workers' democracy based on assemblies, delegate bodies with mandates, coordinating committees for struggle, and new leaderships built from the ground up. The new political situation, therefore, presents a strategic task for revolutionaries: to help transform the growing repudiation of the union bureaucracy into an independent organization of the working class.
The struggle to reclaim the unions for the workers must be part of a broader perspective of building workers' democratic organizations that prepare an alternative power structure in the face of the exhaustion of the entire capitalist system. From this perspective, we need to organize a network of cadres and leaders who will operate within the unions, promoting a revolutionary union movement that fights for class independence, opposes support for any employer-backed government or any measure taken by employers, never calls for voting for a bourgeois party under any circumstances, and organizes a sector of union activism to fight for a workers' and people's government. Winning over and forming a core of union cadres willing to launch a revolutionary movement to battle reformist currents is the strategic task of the coming period.
In the new political situation, the crisis of traditional leadership has not found a consistent response from the reformist left. According to our analysis, the main organizations of the FIT-U (Workers' Left Front - Unity) and the political sectors orbiting around them have deepened a process of adaptation to the bourgeois democratic regime, moving away from a revolutionary strategy of class independence. The entire politics of the Argentine left is summarized in the slogan "Myriam 2027 ," and all the groups within the FIT-U, such as Convergencia, Nuevo MAS, Vía Socialista, and pro-Chávez and pro-Kirchnerist groups like Viento Sur or the Frente Darío Santillán, revolve around it. The "Myriam 2027" campaign of "committees" and "forums" shows that the FIT-U, after 15 years of experience, is a failure because it has transformed its constituent groups (PTS-PO-IS-MST) into small groups that have lost all connection to the leadership of mass movement organizations.
While broad sectors of workers and youth are beginning to break politically with employer-backed alternatives and distrust the regime's institutions, the reformist left's policy remains fundamentally oriented toward electoral and parliamentary contests. Its strategy is based on the assumption that it is possible to transform reality through greater institutional representation, subordinating mass mobilization to the timing and rules of bourgeois democracy. From this perspective, this orientation ultimately serves the stability of the political regime itself. Instead of proposing the need to overcome the institutions of the capitalist state through the independent organization of the working class, it contributes to channeling social discontent into the system's institutional mechanisms, preserving the illusion that bourgeois elections are the primary path to resolving the crisis.
This adaptation is also reflected in the politics of alliances and the lack of a strategic distinction from the traditional leadership of the labor and popular movement. Faced with the various forms of Peronism, criticism is usually limited to circumstantial or electoral aspects, without developing a systematic struggle to challenge its influence over the working class and build an alternative revolutionary leadership. In practice, this orientation contributes to keeping the labor movement within the political confines of the regime.
From our perspective, this policy aligns with the orientation of the Progressive International, which advocates for the administration of capitalism through partial reforms, opposes governability to revolutionary mobilization, and presents the expansion of bourgeois democracy as its strategic horizon. The reformist left abandoned the perspective of socialist revolution and the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, adopting instead a strategy of gradual transformation within the institutions of the bourgeois state. Therefore, for groups like the FITU, elections cease to be seen as a platform for revolutionary propaganda and instead become central to their political strategy. While not denying the tactical importance of electoral participation, it becomes an end in itself; the conquest of parliamentary seats displaces the task of building workers' democratic organizations, coordinating bodies for struggle, and a revolutionary leadership capable of contesting political power.
From a revolutionary Marxist perspective, elections organized by the bourgeois state cannot constitute the mechanism through which workers achieve their emancipation. As long as economic power, the state apparatus, repressive forces, and the mainstream media remain under the control of the bourgeoisie, electoral processes unfold within an institutional framework designed to guarantee the reproduction of the capitalist order. The emancipation of the working class demands the development of its own independent organization and the construction of an alternative power structure based on conscious mobilization and workers' democratic bodies.
In this sense, the growing adaptation of the reformist left represents its break with the revolutionary traditions of Marxism and its consolidation as reformist currents. Instead of preparing the working class to confront and overcome the capitalist system, it strengthens illusions about its reform precisely when the crisis of government, the exhaustion of Peronism, the discrediting of the union bureaucracy, and the questioning of institutions open new possibilities for revolutionary politics. The reformist left responds in defense of the bourgeois democratic regime.
The task of revolutionaries is to develop a policy of class independence that intervenes in the masses' break with the regime, promotes workers' self-organization, and fights to build a revolutionary leadership capable of transforming the political crisis of capitalism into a workers' and socialist solution. Our goal is to defeat those reformist and social-democratic left-wing organizations, paving the way for a sector of activism to integrate into a Marxist and revolutionary project.
Our line: to go on the offensive for a revolutionary alternative
The new political situation presents revolutionaries with a strategic choice. The crisis of Milei's government, the historical exhaustion of Peronism, the growing discrediting of Parliament, the challenge to the union bureaucracy, and the adaptation of the reformist left all reflect the weakening of the main pillars upon which the bourgeois democratic regime in Argentina has rested for decades. We propose defining a precise orientation to guide activists and presenting them with a choice: the reformist strategy or the revolutionary strategy.
Our approach to activism is based on a historical conclusion: the crisis of traditional leadership does not, in itself, guarantee a favorable outcome for the working class. History demonstrates that even in the face of a revolutionary crisis, such as the Argentinazo of 2001, every revolutionary political situation presents two antagonistic perspectives: either the bourgeoisie manages to reestablish its dominance through new political variants and new reformist leaderships, or the working class succeeds in building a revolutionary leadership capable of contesting power. From the perspective of the PST, the task at this stage is not to adapt to the crisis of the regime, but to intervene to deepen it through a policy of class independence.
We are going to launch an offensive against activism with a simple question: Reform or Revolution? It is time to move to the political and ideological offensive, explaining the defeats to which reformism leads us, and we will frame this debate within all the political campaigns we carry out. For example, next year we will campaign for abstention and blank votes, and within the framework of this campaign, we will present activists with the dilemma of "reform or revolution ." We will do the same in the call for the Women's Congress. We seek to define our relationship with activism through this debate and to organize a sector of it to act on behalf of workers, youth, women, and popular sectors around a revolutionary program that proposes a workers' and socialist solution to the crisis.
The debate between Reform and Revolution demands the systematic denunciation of all political variants of the bourgeoisie because, despite their differences, they defend capitalist property, debt repayment, the exploitation of wage labor, and the institutions of the bourgeois state. It also demands combating the policy of conciliation promoted by the union bureaucracy, whose function is to contain struggles, negotiate with employers, and preserve the stability of the system. And the debate between reform and revolution simultaneously requires developing the indispensable political demarcation from the reformist and revisionist left. From our perspective, their adaptation to parliamentarianism, electoral strategy, and the limitations of the bourgeois democratic regime constitutes an obstacle to the political rupture of sectors of the masses advancing toward a revolutionary perspective. Faced with a historical crisis of capitalism, the policy of managing the regime or limiting political action to the conquest of institutional spaces represents a break with the revolutionary traditions of Marxism.
The fundamental debate is not merely electoral or organizational. It is a strategic discussion about two opposing paths. On one side, the strategy of reforming capitalism and managing the bourgeois democratic regime; on the other, the strategy of socialist revolution, based on the conscious mobilization of the working class, the self-organization of the masses, and the construction of a new power. Therefore, the political battle of our time pits two incompatible projects against each other: the preservation of the capitalist order through limited reforms or the revolutionary transformation of society by the working class.
Any policy that subordinates the class struggle to the governability of the regime, to parliamentary agreements, to the institutions of the bourgeois state, or to prioritizing elections, ultimately strengthens the continuity of capitalism. The PST maintains that the only progressive way out of the crisis is a class-based solution; therefore, it is not a matter of changing administrators of capitalism, but of ending the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie. This implies fighting for a workers' government supported by bodies of workers' and people's democracy, which expropriates large economic groups, breaks with all forms of subordination to finance capital, and reorganizes the economy on new social foundations. The construction of a revolutionary Marxist party thus becomes the decisive strategic task.
Without a revolutionary leadership rooted in the working class and capable of intervening in the major events of the class struggle, the crisis of the regime could be diverted or absorbed by new forms of bourgeois domination. Furthermore, we make it clear that any kind of workers' government can never be achieved through elections, but only through a national struggle, an Argentinazo that overthrows the bourgeois government, without giving the bourgeoisie the opportunity to recover. Therefore, we call on all workers, youth, women, and activists to join in building the PST, strengthening a political tool based on class independence, proletarian internationalism, and the revolutionary tradition of Marxism. Faced with the exhaustion of capitalism and all its political variants, it is time to build a revolutionary leadership capable of paving the way to a socialist society.
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